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TRAIL TO PERDITION: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S “EMISSION”
OMISSION DISPOSITION
Jordan Luebkemann*
A protracted case in the Ninth Circuit, Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., has pitted numerous stakeholders, including
two national governments, against one another in a battle to define
the meaning of “disposal” within the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”). At issue were one hundred years of aerial emissions
of heavy metals and other hazardous substances that were
produced in Canada by a lead smelting and refining operation, but
had accumulated on an Indian reservation in the state of
Washington. Relying on two key Ninth Circuit cases, and the lack
of the word “emission” among the statutorily enumerated methods
of “disposal,” a panel of the Ninth Circuit held in July that aerial
emissions of hazardous materials could not give rise to CERCLA
liability.
This holding is problematic for a number of reasons. Most
fundamentally, it misapplied the circuit’s earlier precedent, which
did not require the result announced in Pakootas. In doing so, the
court excluded an entire media of pollution from a remedial statute
that Congress intended to be construed expansively. As a practical
matter, the court’s Pakootas holding provides a strong argument
for industrial polluters seeking to evade CERCLA liability, and
possibly removes the only judicial means of addressing
transnational air pollution entering the United States from
neighboring countries and beyond.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
One early morning in 1969, an assistant dean at the University
of Southern Mississippi set out fishing near Hattiesburg, but was
later found dead in his boat.1 Upon investigation, it was discovered
that the unlucky man had asphyxiated after drifting into an
invisible pocket of propane gas emitted by a wash pipe from a
nearby petroleum refinery and into the river.2 Several years later,
the United States House of Representatives offered this particular
anecdote alongside a litany of other examples that demonstrated
“actual instances of damage caused by current hazardous waste
disposal practices” and the necessity of a new regulatory scheme to
address discarded wastes.3 Congress enacted this new legislation,
1

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 23 (1976).
Id.
3
Id. pt.1 at 17.
2

148

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 146

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),4 after the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act5, seeking to eliminate the last
remaining loopholes in environmental law: unregulated land
disposal, discarded materials, and hazardous wastes.6 The purview
of RCRA addresses “not only solid wastes,” but it also includes
“liquid and contained gaseous wastes, semi-solid waste, and
sludges.”7
Subsequently, RCRA lent its definition of “disposal” to a new
environmental regulatory scheme.8 The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(“CERCLA”)9 was enacted to provide a framework for cleaning up
hazardous waste sites and shifting the costs of that work and any
damages to responsible parties.10 CERCLA features, in the words
of one commenter, “a radical liability scheme that with only a little
exaggeration can be summarized thus: liability is strict, joint,
several, retroactive and perpetual.”11 Although CERCLA borrows
several of its definitions from other statutes,12 its importation of
RCRA’s “disposal” has been the subject of considerable
contention. A protracted case in the Ninth Circuit, Pakootas v.
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,13 has pitted a private company, a tribe,

4

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2016).
See generally 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387.
6
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 4.
7
Id. at 2.
8
42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2016).
9
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2016).
10
Walter E. Mugdan, Superfund: Still Super, Still Fun 323 (Am. Law Inst.,
2015),
http://files.alicle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CX010_chapter_09_t
humb.pdf.
11
Id.
12
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29)–(30) (importing definitions for “disposal”,
“hazardous waste”, “treatment”, “territorial sea”, and “contiguous zone” from
the Solid Waste Disposal Act [Resource Conversation and Recovery Act] and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act]).
13
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). This
decision represents the latest of many accruing over this case’s tumultuous
twelve year history of amended complaints and appeals. For the purposes of this
5
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a state, and two national governments against each other to define
this term and its application, while the resulting decision will
generate potentially far-reaching implications for CERCLA
litigation.
This Recent Development examines the Pakootas decision
within the dual social and legal contexts of air pollution. Part II
introduces the factual backdrop of the Trail Smelter and particular
hazards posed to public health by smelting technologies, while Part
III presents the regulatory frameworks at issue. Part IV analyzes
the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision, arguing that the court
misapplied its precedent in Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal
Corp.,14 and Center for Community Action and Environmental
Justice v. BNSF Railroad Co. (“CCAEJ”).15 Part V concludes with
an examination of the (im)practical repercussions of the decision
as written.
II.
FACTUAL HISTORY
How did a small settlement, overlooking the Columbia River in
the Canadian wilderness, come to have significant effects on
humans, the environment, and international law? This part traces
the social and legal background of the Trail Smelter and the Upper
Columbia River (“UCR”).16 Section A establishes the origins of the
smelter and its long shadow, while Section B considers a brief
procedural overview of the present controversy.
recent development, all mentions of “Pakootas” or “the Pakootas court” will
refer solely to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on July 27, 2016.
14
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001).
15
Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R.R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019
(9th Cir. 2014).
16
This Recent Development adopts the EPA’s definition for the site as “the
areal extent of contamination in the United States associated with the Upper
Columbia River, and all suitable areas in proximity to the contamination
necessary for implementation of response action.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
UNILATERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER
FOR
REMEDIAL
INVESTIGATION/FEASIBILITY STUDY (IN THE MATTER OF: UPPER COLUMBIA
RIVER
SITE),
§ II,
¶
1
(2003),
https://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/CLEANUP.NSF/82751e55bf4ef18488256ecb008
35666/f0e551fb8a69dcd288256fac00064739/$FILE/TeckComincoUAOscan.pdf
[hereinafter “EPA UAO”].
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A. Upper Columbia River Site and the Trail Smelter
For more than 9000 years, indigenous peoples have made their
home in the UCR region, where in 1872, the United States
government granted a reservation to the Colville Tribes by treaty.17
Although subsequent agreements limited the extent of this
territory, the Colville Tribes maintain a reservation along a portion
of the Columbia River known as Lake Roosevelt18 and retain
certain rights over “hunting, fishing, boating, and cultural
resources” along parts of the former territory.19
In 1896, some ten miles north of Washington State, a smelter
was erected along the Columbia River in Trail, British Columbia,
to refine copper and gold.20 Over time, the Trail Smelter grew in
size and output, shifting its production to lead and zinc, and adding
400-foot tall smokestacks to disperse the thousands of tons of
sulfur dioxide it released monthly.21 These higher stacks may have
marginally eased local tensions in Trail, where citizens suffered
damage to crops and livestock, but they also contributed to
increased pollution in Washington’s Colombia Valley.22
Ultimately, it took an international arbitration tribunal and well
over a decade to resolve claims of Washington citizens and the
smelter operators.23 Although the tribunal ordered that the Trail
Smelter “should avoid air emissions that harm Washington,” and
17

Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the
Extraterritorial Application of CERCLA, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9
(2005).
18
A reservoir created by the creation of the Grand Coulee Dam in 1942.
19
Hess, supra note 17, at 9.
20
Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What’s Past Prologue?
EPA Blazes A New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 243 (2006).
21
Id. at 244. The process of lead refining comprises three basic steps: (1)
sintering, (2) reduction, and (3) refining. Because lead naturally occurs as a
sulfide ore, the primary goal of the sintering phase is to reduce sulfur content of
the ore, which is burned off and leaves the plant as sulfur dioxide. However, in
addition to aerial emissions of sulfur dioxide, “nearly every process” involved in
primary lead smelting and refining emits lead fumes and particulate matter.
Background Report: AP-42 Section 12.6: Primary Lead Smelting and Refining,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/ch12/bgdocs/b12s06.pdf.
22
Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 245–46.
23
Id.
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that Canada would be liable for damages resulting from future
emissions, the smelter continued to discard waste products into the
air and water around its plant.24 Throughout the twentieth century,
the Smelter passed through several mergers and iterations of
management before coming to rest with Teck Cominco Metals,
Ltd. (“Teck”), which currently operates the site.25
Today, Teck boasts that the facility is one of the “world’s
largest fully integrated zinc and lead smelting complexes,”
producing 307,000 tons of refined zinc26 and 117,600 tons of lead
concentrate27 in 2015. However, in addition to refined ore, the
smelter continued to produce immense quantities of waste product.
In particular, each year until 1995, its operations discharged up to
145,000 tons of slag, a heavy-metal laden by-product of the
smelting processes, directly into the Columbia River.28 From its
introduction in Trail, the Columbia carried the slag downriver into
the UCR, where it accumulated along the shores and sediments of
Lake Roosevelt.29 This contamination ultimately set in motion the
proceedings that culminated in the Ninth Circuit’s July 2016
Pakootas decision.
B. Procedural History of the Pakootas Saga
After a half century of continued emissions, the Colville Tribes
petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in 1999
to study the UCR for alleged hazards to human health and
environmental contamination from Teck’s discharges.30 These
preliminary assessments found “elevated levels of arsenic, lead,
mercury and other contaminants in the lake,” with contamination
24

Hess, supra note 17, at 4–5.
“Consolidated Mining purchased [the Trail Smelter] in 1906, renamed itself
Cominco in 1966, and merged with Teck Ltd., becoming Teck Cominco Metals,
Ltd., in 2001.” Id. at 5.
26
Trail
Operations,
TECK
COMINCO,
http://www.teck.com/operations/canada/operations/trail-operations/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016).
27
Other Metals, TECK COMINCO, http://www.teck.com/products/other-metals/
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
28
EPA UAO, supra note 16 § II, ¶ 9.
29
Id.
30
Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 267–68.
25
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levels severe enough to render the UCR eligible for listing as a
Superfund site.31 As discussed in greater length in Part III,
Superfund listing recognizes a particular site as one of the most
contaminated in the United States and raises extensive funding to
clean up that site.32
Following the breakdown of an informal negotiation process
with the Canadian smelter operators,33 the EPA issued a Unilateral
Administrative Order (“UAO”) to Teck, requiring the company to
complete a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study
(“RI/FS”).34 The purpose of the RI/FS is to determine the extent of
contamination at the UCR site and to “develop and evaluate
potential remedial alternatives that prevent, mitigate, or otherwise
respond to or remedy any release of . . . hazardous substances” at
the site.35
Two individual enrolled members of the Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Reservation brought the original Pakootas36 suit in
2003 against Teck to enforce the previously disregarded UAO.37
This suit brought CERCLA claims for Teck’s contamination of the
Columbia River for direct discharge of hazardous materials in both

31

Matthew Preusch, Pollution Dispute in Northwest Straddles the Border,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/20/us/pollutiondispute-in-northwest-straddles-the-border.html?_r=1. See infra Part III.A for a
discussion of Superfund listing under CERCLA.
32
See infra Part III.A.
33
Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 267–68.
34
EPA UAO, supra note 16, § V, ¶¶ 1–5(a).
35
Id. § V, ¶ 5(a).
36
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL
2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004), aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).
37
Following the 2006 Ninth Circuit decision, Teck and its separately
incorporated American counterpart, Teck Cominco American, Inc. (“TCAI”),
entered into a settlement with the EPA, in which the companies agreed to
complete the RI/FS for the UCR Site. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION AND
FEASIBILITY STUDY AT THE UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER SITE (June 2, 2006),
https://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/CLEANUP.NSF/7780249be8f251538825650f007
0bd8b/f0e551fb8a69dcd288256fac00064739/$FILE/TeckCominco_SettlementA
greement.pdf.
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solid and liquid form.38 After a truly byzantine case history, which
is beyond the scope of this paper,39 the Plaintiffs sought, and
ultimately were granted leave to file a fourth amended complaint,
which added an airborne theory of CERCLA liability for Teck’s
aerial emissions “including, but not limited to, lead compounds,
arsenic compounds, cadmium compounds and mercury
compounds,” which had come to be located in, and cause harm at
the UCR.40
When Teck moved to strike or dismiss the aerial-disposition
claims, the district court denied the motion.41 Shortly thereafter, the
Ninth Circuit ruled in Center for Community Action and
Environmental Justice v. BNSF (“CCAEJ”) that RCRA could not
reach diesel exhaust from idling railyard locomotives,42 prompting
Teck to file a motion to reconsider with the district court.43
Specifically, Teck sought reconsideration of the court’s decision to
allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include aerial claims,
as well as for the court’s rejection of Teck’s motion to dismiss
those claims.44
38

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.
2006).
39
The early phases of the litigation concerned numerous objections to
jurisdiction by Teck, during which the Canadian smelter stipulated that it had
discharged slag into the Columbia River in Canada, with the result that some of
that slag arrived at the UCR Site in the United States, “where it has leached and
continues to leach hazardous substances into the water and sediment of the
Columbia River,” causing “at least $1” in damages. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016). Despite Teck’s claims that it
was beyond the reach of American law, after determining jurisdiction satisfied,
the court found Teck liable as a CERCLA “arranger” on Plaintiffs’ “river
pathway” claims, because it “had intentionally disposed of waste into the
Columbia River knowing that at least some of it would flow across the border.”
Id. For greater treatment of the early procedural history and the international law
issues, see generally Libin Zhang, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 31
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2007).
40
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016).
41
Id. at 980.
42
See discussion of Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R.R. Co.,
764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014), infra Part IV.B.
43
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL
7408399, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014).
44
Id.
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Although the district court distinguished the Pakootas aerial
claims from earlier Ninth Circuit precedent, it recognized that with
respect to how RCRA’s “disposal” is to be applied in the context
of CERCLA, “no court ha[d] addressed this issue head-on.”45
Consequently, the court certified its order for an immediate
interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit,46 leading to the Pakootas
decision considered herein. This Recent Development now
examines key provisions of CERCLA and RCRA as a foundation
for analyzing the errors of the Pakootas decision.
III.
STATUTORY OVERVIEW
If the general stereotype is that national environmental
regulatory statutes are dense and complicated, neither CERCLA
nor RCRA represent a deviation from that rule. The Ninth Circuit
has previously observed that, “neither a logician nor a grammarian
will find comfort” in CERCLA’s “maze” of regulations.47 This part
seeks to explain the basic thrust and relevant requirements of (A)
CERCLA and (B) RCRA, before turning to the Ninth Circuit’s
recent application of these statutes in Part IV.
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act
Enacted in 1980, CERCLA has two principle goals: “(1) to
ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of waste disposal sites,
and (2) to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances
bear the cost of remedying the conditions they created.”48 To

45

Id. at *4.
Id.
47
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880, 883 (9th Cir.
2001). The court went on to liken a search though CERCLA’s legislative history
akin to a “snark hunt.” Id. at 885.
48
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 968
(9th Cir. 2013) (alteration omitted)).
46
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empower the act to complete these purposes, courts have generally
interpreted CERCLA’s definitions and mandates liberally.49
To meet the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites around the
country, CERCLA created the “Superfund” Program as a trust to
cover the formulation and execution of decontamination plans.50
As there are thousands of waste sites scatted across the country, the
EPA created the National Priority List in 1983 to prioritize
response action under Superfund.51 In turn, a combination of
Congressional appropriations and CERCLA penalties paid by
responsible parties finances Superfund.52
To establish liability under CERCLA, the Act requires a
plaintiff to meet each of four elements:
(1)
the site on which the hazardous substances
are contained is a “facility” under CERCLA’s
definition of that term, Section 101(9), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(9);
(2)
a “release” or “threatened release” of any
“hazardous substance” from the facility has
occurred, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4);
(3)
such “release” or “threatened release” has
caused the plaintiff to incur response costs that were
“necessary” and “consistent with the national
contingency plan,” 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4) and
(a)(4)(B); and

49

See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976
F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We construe CERCLA liberally to achieve
these goals.”). See also infra note 115.
50
What is the “Superfund” Program?, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES,
http://toxmap.nlm.nih.gov/toxmap/faq/2009/08/what-is-thesuperfund-program.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
51
Superfund
History,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-history (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
52
This is Superfund: A Community Guide to EPA’s Superfund Program 3,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://semspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/175197.pdf.
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(4)
the defendant is within one of four classes of
persons subject to the liability provisions of Section
107(a).53
Regarding the first element, in addition to buildings and
structures that might be contemplated by lay use of the word
“facility,” under CERCLA, the term encompasses “any site or area
where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.”54 For the second
element, a “release” of a “hazardous substance” means “any
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing
into the environment” of any substance designated as hazardous by
any of several other federal regulatory schemes.55 As to the fourth
element, the classes of liable persons56 (“potentially responsible
parties” or “PRPs”) include, inter alia, “any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal . . . of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility.”57 Although the terms
“dispose,” “disposal,” and “disposing” appear throughout these
provisions, to add to the challenges of this dense recovery scheme,
CERCLA does not itself define the term, but rather adopts its
definition from RCRA.58

53

3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1358
(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152
(9th Cir. 1989)).
54
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2016).
55
Id. § 9601(14), (22) (emphasis added). The definition specifically
enumerates the CWA, CAA, RCRA, and TSCA (the Toxic Substances Control
Act).
56
Id. § 9601(21). A “person” as defined by CERCLA includes “an individual,
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture,
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body. Id.
57
Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
58
See id. § 9601(29).
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B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The first objective of RCRA is to “promote the protection of
health and the environment.”59 The statute enumerates eleven
strategies to reach this objective, including the “application of solid
waste management, resource recovery, and resource conservation
systems which preserve and enhance the quality of air, water, and
land resources.”60 Thus, while RCRA may properly be considered
a regulatory scheme for solid waste, it does not follow that aerial
disposition of solid waste is beyond its contours.61 Within this
context, the RCRA “disposal” refers to the
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on
any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment
or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters,
including ground waters.62
Notably, the word “emitting” is absent from this definition of
“disposal.”63 As described herein, the Ninth Circuit attached great
significance to this omission in Pakootas. The following section
analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s “disposal” jurisprudence across
several RCRA and CERCLA cases.
IV.
THEORIES OF “DISPOSAL”
This part examines the recent evolution of the body of law
construing RCRA and CERCLA “disposal” in the Ninth Circuit
leading to the Pakootas decision here at issue. Section A focuses
on the 2001 en banc decision in Carson Harbor, while Section B
unpacks the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 holding in CCAEJ. After
examining these two primary decisions on which Pakootas relies,
59

Id. § 6902(a).
Id. § 6902(a)(10) (emphasis added).
61
See supra text accompanying notes 1–6.
62
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2016).
63
See id. Compare to CERCLA definition for “release,” which includes
“disposing,” “emitting,” “emptying,” “escaping,” “leaching,” “pouring,” and
“pumping,” in addition to “discharging,” “dumping,” “injecting,” “leaking,” and
“spilling”—forms that overlap the RCRA/CERCLA definition for “disposal.”
Id. § 9601(22).
60
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Section C turns to that decision itself to analyze its weaknesses.
Finally, Section D suggests how the court could have arrived at a
better decision, and why Supreme Court review is important to
protect Congress’ intent for CERCLA.
A. Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.
Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp. provides the
basis for the Ninth Circuit’s Pakootas holding that Congress could
not have intended passive migration to trigger liability under
CERCLA.64 A closer look at this case demonstrates Carson
Harbor’s far more nuanced final holding, including the rejection of
a bright-line rule for passive migration liability.65
Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. (“Carson”) operated a mobile
home park in southern California.66 The land, which Carson
previously acquired from another mobile home operator
(“Partnership defendants”), had been leased to the Unocal
Corporation from 1945 to 1983, during which Unocal used the
property in oil exploitation, operating numerous wells, pipelines,
storage tanks, and other elements of petroleum production.67 When
Carson attempted to refinance the property in 1993, the operation
discovered hazardous tar-like and slag materials in an open-flow
wetland covering a part of the property.68 Carson was required to
remove the materials and brought suit to seek recovery of its
$285,000 in expenses from Unocal, the Partnership defendants,
and several other parties.69

64

See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir.
2016).
65
See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir.
2001) (“We therefore reject the absolute binary “active/passive” distinction used
by some courts.”).
66
Id. at 868.
67
See id.
68
See id. Further investigation confirmed the hazardous materials were byproducts and wastes from petroleum production, which had remained on the
property since well before the mobile home park was developed. Id.
69
See id. at 868–70. The complaint also identified the County of Los Angeles,
Cities of Compton and Carson, and Caltrans (the California Department of
Transportation), which operates an adjacent freeway, a three-mile section of
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The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants
on the CERCLA claims,70 from which Carson appealed. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed that there was no liability for the Partnership
defendants, but reversed the lower court, finding summary
judgment inappropriate as to Unocal and the Government
defendants.71
Within the four requirements of a CERCLA claim,72 the final
element requires a showing that the defendant is a PRP, which in
this case, turned on whether or not a “disposal” had occurred
during each defendant’s successive tenure of the property.73 Based
on its interpretation of the statute, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
despite the “passive migration” of contaminants through the soil
concurrent with the Partnership defendants’ ownership, no
“disposal” took place during that time.74
Relying on the plain meaning of RCRA’s definition of
disposal, the court found significant that within the same statute
“release” was defined by a list that included “disposal,” as well as
several other forms, indicating it is a broader term than
“disposal.”75 Limiting its attention to the plain meaning of the
terms defining “disposal,” the court determined that none of the
plain meanings of “discharge,” “deposit,” “injection,” “dumping,”
“spilling,” “leaking,” or “placing” was applicable to the migration
of hydrocarbons through the wetlands during the ownership of the
Partnership defendants.76
However, the court was careful to “reject the absolute binary
‘active/passive’ distinction used by some courts,”77 engaging
which drains into the wetlands. Id. at 868. Collectively, the court referred to this
group as the “Government defendants.” Id.
70
See id. at 870. Originally, Carson also brought additional RCRA and CWA
claims which it did not pursue on appeal. Id. at 870 n.2.
71
See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 888.
72
See supra text accompanying note 53.
73
See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 874.
74
See id.
75
See id. at 878; see also supra note 63.
76
See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879–80.
77
See id. There is a multi-tiered circuit split regarding both (1) whether
CERCLA liability is available for “passive” migration of hazardous materials
and (2) how to determine what constitutes active, versus passive, migrations. See
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instead in a more factual, case-specific analysis. In fact, the court
explicitly states that while “‘disposal’ does not include passive soil
migration . . . it may include other passive migration,” recognizing
that “[h]olding passive owners responsible for migration of
contaminants that results from their conduct and for passive
migration ensures the prompt and effective cleanup” intended by
Congress enactment of CERCLA.78 Thus, Carson Harbor does not
stand for the proposition that CERCLA forecloses liability for any
passive migration, despite attempts by the Pakootus court to
shoehorn it in to that position. Section C develops the flaw of this
mischaracterization.
B. Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice v.
BNSF R. Co.
In addition to Carson Harbor, the Court in Pakootas drew
heavily on Center for Community Action and Environmental
Justice in rejecting the Plaintiffs’ aerial-based CERCLA claims.
CCAEJ featured a RCRA claim to enjoin two defendant rail yard
operating companies from emitting diesel particulate matter
(“DPM”) via sixteen railyards across California.79 Environmental
groups sued the two organizations on the basis that the defendants
allow DPM to be “discharged into the air, from which it falls onto
the ground and water nearby” before becoming “re-entrained into
the air by wind, air currents and passing vehicles,” causing harm at
each step, as people inhale the airborne particles.80 The district
court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.81 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order, strictly

generally Khara Coleman, Disposing of Leaks and Spills: Passive Disposal of
Hazardous Wastes Under CERCLA, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 945 (2002).
78
Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 881.
79
See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019,
1021 (9th Cir. 2014).
80
Id. Plaintiffs cite to California Air Resources Board, which has conducted
studies finding over 1.8 million Californians subject to increased risks for cancer
precisely due to railyard operations. Id.
81
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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construing the definition of “disposal” based on its statutory and
legislative history.82
By rephrasing the requirements of the RCRA citizen suit
provision83 to address plaintiffs’ claim, the Ninth Circuit stated
that, in order to survive summary judgment, plaintiffs would have
to plausibly allege “that Defendants have contributed to the past or
are contributing to the present handling, treatment, transportation,
or disposal of diesel particulate matter.”84 The Ninth Circuit once
again turned to a textual analysis of RCRA’s definition of
“disposal,” first finding that the lack of reference to “emitting,”
despite its inclusion within the definition of “release,” meant that
Congress had intended to exclude it.85
Secondly, the court determined RCRA’s “disposal”
definition—referring to enumerated means of introducing solid “or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters”86—to create a temporal requirement whereby solid waste
must be “first placed into or on any land or water and is thereafter
emitted into the air.”87 To buttress this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit visited the legislative history of RCRA, highlighting its
purpose as a system of solid waste control and its lack of any
provision to regulate airborne emissions, and “even

82

Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1030.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2016).
84
Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1023. They did not reach
the second and third prongs “that diesel particulate matter is a “solid waste,” and
that the solid waste that Defendants emit “may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” id., because plaintiffs
failed the first. Id. at 1030 n.10.
85
Id. at 1024–25 (“[E]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius stands for the
proposition that when Congress expresses meaning through a list, a court may
assume that what is not listed is excluded.”); see also supra text accompanying
note 63.
86
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2016).
87
Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1024 (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
83
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contemplat[ion] [of] the disposal of material into the air” in its
original form.88
This premise is factually mistaken.89 In fact, Congress includes
an anecdote of a purely gaseous discharge in the legislative history
underlying the original enactment of RCRA.90 Moreover, the 1984
Amendments expanded RCRA into regulatory jurisdiction that had
previously been the exclusive purview of the Clean Air Act,
expressly due to Congress’ frustration with the EPA’s “appallingly
slow” performance under the latter.91
As another scholar has observed, RCRA was conceived to
“supplement” the media-based regimes—such as the CAA, the
CWA, and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)—to prevent
“simply chasing toxic pollutants from one media to the next.”92
The Supreme Court has previously confirmed that RCRA
“empowers EPA to regulate hazardous wastes from cradle to
grave.”93 Thus, in the face of statutory ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit
should have been more wary of endorsing such a narrow reading of
the statute, which is concerned not with the media by which solid
waste may be disposed, but the very disposal of the waste itself.
The court’s “order-of-disposal” rule94 needlessly creates a
bright line that may function to exclude citizen suits that Congress

88

Id. at 1026–28.
See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
90
See id.
91
S. REP. NO. 98-284, at 63 (1983). The report continued on to note that a full
quarter of sites on the Superfund National Priority List were at that time had
been added “at least in part because of potential threats to health and the
environment from emissions of hazardous pollutants into the air.” Id.
92
See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of
United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First
Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 83 (2001).
93
City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994) (holding ash
generated by municipal solid waste incinerators is not exempt from RCRA)
(emphasis added).
94
In essence, that RCRA “disposal” exclusively treats waste that is first
disposed either onto the ground or into the water, from which it may then be reintroduced to the air. See CCAEJ, 764 F.3d at 1024.
89
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intended in enacting RCRA.95 On a practical level, the rule
provides relatively little guidance for borderline cases. Certainly,
the Ninth Circuit cannot mean to suggest that hazardous waste
generators may evade RCRA liability by directing their employees
to “fling” hazardous waste over the property line, guaranteeing that
it reaches ground or water only after first passing through the air.96
Other jurisdictions have avoided the pitfall of this type of rule
by explicitly engaging in a case-by-case analysis of the facts. In
United States v. Power Engineering Co., the Tenth Circuit
determined that a refurbishing facility whose air scrubbers97
sprayed a condensate mist of hexavalent chromium into the air did
“dispose” within the meaning of RCRA.98 The lower court had
previously rejected defendant’s contention that the scrubbers did
not place “solid waste into or on any land or water,” despite the
spray’s origin several feet above the ground.99
A case in the Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in the
Southern District of Ohio in Citizens Against Pollution v. Ohio
Power Co.100 There, flue gas from a coal plant was seen to touch
95

Recent Case, Environmental Law—Particulate Matter Emissions—Ninth
Circuit Holds that the Emission of Pollutants from Rail Yards is Not “Disposal”
of Solid Waste Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Center for
Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway Co., 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1272, 1276–79 (2015) [Hereinafter “HARV. L. REV. CCAEJ”].
96
See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5–6, Ctr. For Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justive
v. BNSFR Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-56086) (“From the
standpoint of [a] neighbor, the result, and the injury, is exactly the same”
whether hazardous materials enter her by land or air.).
97
Air pollution scrubbers remove heavy metals (such as lead and mercury),
volatile organic compounds (such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides), and
particulate matter from aerial emissions through chemical and physical
processes. While scrubbers reduce air pollution, they concurrently increase solid
and liquid waste streams due to the collected contaminant sludges and process
water. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Air Pollution Control Technology
Factsheet 1–4, https://www3.epa.gov/ttncatc1/dir1/fsprytwr.pdf (last visited Oct.
26, 2016).
98
See United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir.
1999).
99
See United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1157–58 (D.
Colo. 1998) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
100
See Citizens Against Pollution v. Ohio Power Co., No. C2-04-CV-371,
2006 WL 6870564 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2006).
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down on land in visible blue plumes, during which time nearby
residents experienced headaches and a constellation of respiratory
problems.101 The court held that the flue gas meets RCRA’s
definition of solid waste.102 Secondly, despite travelling through the
air from the top of the coal plant’s 830-foot tall stacks, the
observed contact of the blue plumes with the ground was sufficient
to the court to find that such solid waste was discharged onto the
ground.103
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected Citizens Against Pollution
in a footnote as “contrary to RCRA’s text and legislative history”
without further explanation, it applied the better test. What this
Recent Development will term the “demonstrable contact”
standard of Citizens Against Pollution and Power Engineering Co.
relies on a more fact-specific inquiry, namely (1) whether a
discharge of a solid waste occurred, and (2) whether there was
some demonstrable contact between the waste and the ground or
water. While the first prong considers the expansive definitions for
solid/hazardous waste under RCRA and CERCLA, the second
would limit “disposal” liability to circumstances where some form
of evidence—such as eyewitness observation, as with the blue
plumes, or chemical testing, as with the hexavalent chromium
spray—could demonstrate a tangible land or water contact of
defendant’s specific discharges.104 This test could have facilitated a
better outcome for the Pakootas case, which is considered below in
sections C and D.
C. Structure of the 2016 Pakootas Decision
As previously outlined, the Ninth Circuit heard Pakootas as an
interlocutory appeal of the district court’s refusal to grant Teck’s
101

See id. at *1–2.
“The term ‘solid waste’ means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and
other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous
material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural
operations, and from community activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2016).
103
See Citizens Against Pollution, 2006 WL 6870564, at *4–5.
104
See, e.g., Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1157; Citizens Against
Pollution, 2006 WL 6870564 at *2.
102
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motion to reconsider allowing Plaintiffs to amend their complaint
to include claims for aerially-deposited waste and denying
Defendants’ motion to dismiss those charges.105 Despite being
“confident in its analysis” of the question of first impression, the
Eastern District of Washington certified its order for immediate
appeal to the Ninth Circuit to review its findings, noting the
“substantial ground for difference of opinion” on whether
CERCLA could reach Teck’s aerial emissions.106 In July 2016, the
Ninth Circuit overturned the district court, relying in large part on
its previous decisions in Carson Harbor and CCAEJ.107
The court’s legal analysis proceeds through a statutory
construction peppered with references to Carson Harbor and
CCAEJ. Confronted with Plaintiffs’ aerial disposition theory that
(1) Teck “deposited” hazardous substances onto the land or water
of the UCR site and that (2) “deposit” is one of the words used to
define “disposal” by 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3), the court seized on what
it saw as the passive implications of that theory.108 Because
Plaintiffs’ aerial disposition theory appeared to be that Teck
“allow[ed] hazardous substances to be ‘deposit[ed]’ at the UCR
Site by the wind,” rather than by depositing the waste there
directly, the Ninth Circuit determined it must reject their claim
based on a Carson Harbor footnote.109 The note contends, “as used
in the statute, the term [deposit] is akin to ‘putting down,’ or
placement. Nothing in the context of the statute or the term
‘disposal’ suggests that Congress meant to include chemical or
geologic processes or passive migration.”110 Section D, below,
discusses the error of treating this one-off statement as dispositive.
In addition, the Pakootas court leaned heavily on the recent
CCAEJ decision, which by its understanding “involved essentially
105

See supra Part II.B.
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL
7408399, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014).
107
See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir.
2016).
108
See id. at 983.
109
See id.
110
Id. (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d at 879 &
n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)).
106
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the same facts.”111 Namely, both cases involved airborne emissions
of hazardous substances that caused harm first through direct
inhalation, and then by being later “re-entrained into the air” after
landing on the ground.112 Pakootas adopted CCAEJ’s analysis of
the emission omission, paraphrasing that “Congress knew how to
use the word ‘emit’ when it wanted to,” and suggesting that this
absence demonstrated Congress’ intent to exclude “emission” from
the definition of “disposal.”113 However, the court also conceded
that CCAEJ’s construction of “disposal” within the context of
RCRA “does not absolutely foreclose a different interpretation of
‘disposal’ for CERCLA purposes,” instead, that its analysis is
merely “persuasive.”114
D. A Better Reading: The Court Should Have Distinguished
Carson Harbor and CCAEJ
The Ninth Circuit’s self-constrained opinion in Pakootas
disappoints the intent of the environmental frameworks it
interprets, while embellishing distinguishable holdings into a novel
construction of “disposal” that creates an arbitrary gap in the
CERCLA field. The court hinted several times that it could be
persuaded to embrace Plaintiffs’ argument, were it writing on a
“blank slate” and not constrained to its holdings in CCAEJ and
Carson Harbor.115 Although the court is correct to note the writing
on its slate, a more careful examination of the earlier precedent
reveals that those decisions left the court with plenty of blank
space in which to scribe a better opinion.
This part begins by arguing that these cases were
distinguishable and should not have been applied to prevent
111

Id. at 983–84 (citing Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R.
Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014)).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 984 (citing Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 562
(2007)) (“The natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning . . . is not rigid and readily
yields whenever there is such variation . . . as reasonably to warrant the
conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different
intent.”).
115
See id. at 984, 986.
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Plaintiffs’ theory. However, looking past the shortcomings of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, it also contends that the Supreme Court
should review this case for two principle reasons. Namely, it
should repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s 2016 Pakootas decision and
should also address the circuit split over passive and active
disposal, which has confused CERCLA litigation nationally.
It is axiomatic that RCRA and CERCLA require expansive—
though not unlimited—interpretation, and any analysis of a claim
based on these statutes must begin by recognizing their broad
mandates.116 The Ninth Circuit has previously recognized this
guidance,117 even paying lip service to it in Pakootas, but its
strenuous work to narrow the reach of “disposal” in recent
decisions runs counter to this general principle. However, despite
the similarities of sweeping breadth of RCRA and CERCLA, the
two schemes do serve different purposes.
First, notwithstanding the fact that CERCLA borrows its
definition of “disposal” from RCRA, the two Acts serve distinct
ends through distinct means.118 The Supreme Court has made it
clear that “CERCLA differs markedly from RCRA . . . in the
remedies it provides.”119 Thus, investigation into the legislative
history and statutory context of either Act may have only limited
application to the other. The Supreme Court has previously noted
that the usage of an identical term in different parts of the same act
may overcome the presumption that “they are intended to have the
116

See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“Because it is a remedial statute, CERCLA must be construed liberally to
effectuate its two primary goals.”); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) (“As numerous courts have observed, CERCLA is
a remedial statute which should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals.”);
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th
Cir. 1990) (“We note that a liberal judicial interpretation of the term [“arrange”]
is required in order that we achieve CERCLA’s ‘overwhelmingly remedial’
statutory scheme.”).
117
See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d
1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We construe CERCLA liberally to achieve these
goals.”).
118
See Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 263 (“Thus we agree with the
Government’s contention that RCRA’s goals differ from those of CERCLA.”).
119
Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996).
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same meaning” where it is clearly demonstrated that the terms
were “employed in different parts of the act with different
intent.”120
An amicus brief to the Pakootas court on behalf of the United
States argued for such a conclusion regarding “disposal” as it
relates to the different contexts of RCRA and CERCLA.121 From
this perspective, the Ninth Circuit should have announced that the
same statutory and legislative analysis of RCRA that excluded
diesel particulate matter from the discharging, depositing,
injecting, dumping, spilling, leaking, and placing122 that constitute
“disposal” did not yield the same result for the litany of
contaminants spewed by the Teck Smelter, considered in light of
the purposes123 and history of CERCLA.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s strong reliance on CCAEJ was
imprudent because that case can be legally and factually
distinguished from Pakootas on several grounds. First, the CCAEJ
decision weighs heavily that the plaintiffs in that case could have
relied on the CAA to bring a citizen enforcement suit, but resorted
instead to the less demanding, less on-point standard under
RCRA’s citizen suit provision.124
120

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007).
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at
11–12, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016)
(No. 15-35228). Furthermore, as the Pakootas II district court notes, CCAEJ is a
RCRA case which “makes no mention of CERCLA.” Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *1 (E.D.
Wash. Dec. 31, 2014). That CERCLA was never contemplated in construing one
of its central terms underlines the impropriety of letting CCAEJ speak for it. See
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 16,
Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228).
122
See 42 U.S.C § 6903(3) (2016) (defining “disposal”).
123
Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 483 (citing Gen. Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (C.A. 8 1990)) (“[T]he two . . .
main purposes of CERCLA . . . prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party.”).
124
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at
13, Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228); see also Ctr. for Cmty. Action &
Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1022 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2014)
(describing the much more limited scope of CAA citizen suit provisions than
those of RCRA).
121
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Specifically, CCAEJ took issue with plaintiffs’ attempt to make
RCRA do the work of the CAA,125 for which there is no factual
analogy to Pakootas. For the CCAEJ court, the crux of case
concerned controlling defendants’ aerial emissions of pollutants to
prevent their inhalation, which it regarded as an “air quality
problem for the CAA, not RCRA.”126 The court went on to find
that “‘RCRA, as we interpret it, does not extend to these
emissions,’ i.e., emissions otherwise regulated by the CAA.”127 On
the contrary, in Pakootas, the CAA would be barred as an
extraterritorial application of domestic law precisely because it
controls emissions—which occur in Canada—but CERCLA is not,
because it is only concerned with retroactive cleanup for the
contaminated site—which is located in the United States.128
Additionally, while the CCAEJ plaintiffs indicated concerns
primarily with the airborne effects of DPM as a respiratory
antagonist, the Pakootas plaintiffs highlight that hazardous
substances contained within Teck’s aerially-released waste “have
come to be located in . . . the surface water and ground water,
sediments, upland areas, and biological resources which comprise
the Upper Columbia River Site.”129 Because these claims focus on
the accumulation of deposits in the ground, rather than in the air, it
is clear they do not violate CCAEJ’s order-of-deposit rule.130
Rather than apply the temporal requirement shakily articulated
in CCAEJ, the court should have recognized the previous panel
had “implicitly performed a case-specific analysis into the nature
of the pollution” and should have done the same here.131 Similar to
the so-called “demonstrable contact” standard articulated in this
See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice, 764 F.3d at 1022 & n.3.
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at
14–15, Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228).
127
Id. at 11–12 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl.
Justice, 764 F.3d at 1029).
128
See infra discussion of extraterritoriality and CERCLA, Part V.B.
129
Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 979.
130
See supra note 95.
131
HARV. L. REV. CCAEJ, supra note 95, at 1279 (noting the court could have
analyzed such factors as “the density of aerosolized waste, breadth of fallout
area, concentration of contamination, site of emission, and relevant legislative
history”).
125

126
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paper,132 a fact-intensive analysis better serves the purpose of
CERCLA by not excising entire media of transmission from its
ambit. Had the Ninth Circuit undertaken this type of inquiry in
Pakootas, weighing factors such as the enormous quantity and
extensive timeline of Teck’s aerial emissions, their demonstrated
presence in the soils and waters of the UCR,133 and the extent to
which other sources were or were not sufficient to account for the
contamination, the court may have reached a different conclusion.
Furthermore, as the Pakootas court acknowledged, there may
be a basis for “deviating” from earlier cases where a rigid
application “‘would thwart the overall statutory scheme or lead to
an absurd result’ in some way not considered by those cases.”134
Intuitively, the wholesale exclusion of airborne contamination
from a regulatory scheme designed to efficiently address pollution
and protect public health would seem to be an absurd result, as it
thwarts CERCLA’s guiding purposes.135 After all, the Pakootas
court neither claims nor furnishes evidence to suggest that aerial
contamination represents a somehow negligible effect on human
and environmental health as compared to water or ground-based
discharges.
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Carson Harbor was equally
misguided. Like CCAEJ, that case should have been distinguished
from Pakootas on both factual and legal grounds. Asserting that
Carson Harbor stands for the proposition that no passive migration
of contaminants can qualify as a RCRA or CERCLA “disposal”136
was the Pakootas court’s major error with respect to the former
case. Instead, the earlier en banc hearing announced a more limited
holding, in which it “reject[ed] the absolute binary ‘active/passive’
See supra Part IV.B.
EPA UAO, supra note 16, § II, ¶¶ 4–6.
134
Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985 (quoting Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space
Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2013)).
135
As discussed earlier, CERCLA was designed to (1) rapidly and efficiently
rehabilitate contaminated sites and (2) ensure that the entities responsible for
creating the pollution pay the clean-up costs. See supra text accompanying notes
48–49, Part III.A.
136
Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Carson Harbor Vill.,
Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 862, 879 & n.7).
132

133
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distinction” employed in other jurisdictions,137 concluding only that
“‘disposal’ does not include passive soil migration but that it may
include other passive migration.”138 There the court reasoned that
even while Congress would not have intended all passive
migration to qualify as a CERCLA “disposal,” if disposals
“include only releases directly caused by affirmative human
conduct,” then CERCLA’s strict liability scheme for “any person
who at the time of disposal . . . owned or operated any facility”
would “make no sense.”139 Thus, the Pakootas panel’s notion that
Carson Harbor eliminated liability for passive migration is not
only misleading, but also mistaken.
Instead, even if Teck’s aerial deposits were “passive,” the court
should have considered whether they were similar enough in
character to the subset of passive migration excluded under Carson
Harbor to compel the finding that Teck’s contamination, too, was
the excluded kind. Although the earlier en banc holding stopped
short of elucidating which types of passive migration still may
trigger CERCLA liability, the numerous and material factual
disparities between the two cases should have guided the Pakootas
court to distinguish the former. Carson Harbor concerned the
decades-long migration of hydrocarbons through soil, which
continued after the conclusion of the petroleum production that
unleashed it, rather than the highly mobile, and ongoing, aerial
contamination of Teck’s smelter. The Carson Harbor court also
worried that if it announced an interpretation of “disposal”
embracing “all subsoil passive migration” it would virtually
eliminate the innocent landowner defense.140 There is no such

137

Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879–80 (9th Cir.
2001).
138
Id. at 881.
139
Id.
140
Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 882. The innocent landowner defense prevents
CERCLA liability where “[a]t the time the defendant acquired the facility the
defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in,
or at the facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). The court worried the already narrow
defense would disappear by adopting a “never-ending” theory of disposal. Id.
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concern in Pakootas, as Teck has been, and continues to be,
responsible for the discharges of its plant.141
Furthermore, even if Carson Harbor had eliminated the
liability for passive migration, the Pakootas court could have
simply recognized that Teck’s aerial emissions were anything but
passive. Unlike the “gradual spread” of spilled chemicals,142 Teck
unleashed direct and affirmative discharges from its smelting
process, through a 400-foot tall stack built precisely to carry the
hazardous waste gases away from the plant.143 After discharge, the
contained solid wastes from Teck’s flue gas settle out across both
the land and water of the UCR, bringing Plaintiff’s aerial
disposition theory well within the intent of RCRA/CERCLA
“disposal.”144
It would be difficult, even disingenuous, to argue that
continuously burning an array of fuels and metals in a tightly
orchestrated chemical equation for over one hundred years would
result in the kind of unexpected discharge one might ascribe to a
leaky barrel. To the extent the court appears to consider a time
requirement, even allowing that the cumulative deposits accrued in
the UCR over a long time, it is unlikely that any particular day’s
worth of discharges hung in the atmosphere for decades before
falling back to the earth.
Finally, there were significant policy reasons for the Ninth
Circuit to reject Teck’s arguments and find its aerial emissions
141

Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. is the product of a 2001 merger between Teck,
Ltd. and Cominco (formerly Consolidated Mining), which had operated the
smelter since 1906. See Hess, supra note 17, at 5. Due to the “strict, joint,
several, retroactive and perpetual” nature of CERCLA liability, Mugdan, supra
note 10, Teck is a potentially responsible party for the entirety of the smelter’s
emissions during the last century and beyond. See also discussion of CERCLA
liability, supra Part III.A. Moreover, the “innocent landowner” defense
contemplates an unknowing secondary purchaser, such as the Partnership
defendants in Carson Harbor, supra Part IV.A. This defense would be
unavailable in a merger between one PRP and another mining company familiar
with the impacts of the first’s operation, and that continued the site’s operation
jointly after the merger.
142
Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879.
143
Robinson-Dorn, supra note 20, at 244.
144
See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2016).
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within the reach of CERCLA. Since the enactment of the major
national environmental legislation and increasingly in recent years,
citizen suits have been instrumental tools in enforcing the missions
of the major environmental regulatory schemes, given that:
The cooperative framework, which presupposes
diligent and uniform state regulation, has broken
down. State and federal enforcement budgets are
being slashed, reducing government oversight and
potentially allowing more violations of law to go
unpunished. Moreover, political considerations-including interstate competition and pressure from
industry to minimize regulation--threaten to further
compromise the states’ ability to enforce the laws.
As government enforcement becomes increasingly
less reliable, citizen enforcement of environmental
law is more necessary than ever.145
Against this backdrop, one might expect the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to exclude an entire media of pollution from the reaches
of the most important environmental remediation statute would
have only resulted from restrictive precedent leaving no other
option. As this review of the Ninth Circuit’s earlier holdings has
shown, that was not the case. Despite numerous reasons to
distinguish CCAEJ and Carson Harbor, the court failed to do so,
creating a regulatory gap further considered below.
V.
AERIAL FALLOUT: PROSPECTIVE IMPLICATIONS
The Ninth Circuit was correct to note its decision will provoke
“ripple effects,”146 which are considered here. Specifically, this part
analyzes the narrower effects on the remainder of the Pakootas
saga in Section A, before attempting to diagnose the far larger
implications for CERCLA litigation in the United States—and
beyond—in Section B. To demonstrate the potential restrictions in
145

Will Reisinger et. al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of
Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?,
20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2010).
146
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 982–83 (9th Cir.
2016).
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CERCLA’s reach, Section C studies the airborne health threats
accruing from the maquiladora system of the Mexican Borderlands
through the lens of the Pakootas decision.
A. Effects on Remainder of Pakootas Litigation
The Ninth Circuit’s July 2016 decision in Pakootas has the
potential to limit the outcomes of not only the case at hand, but
also all future CERCLA and RCRA suits. In the current case, the
effects may be more limited. The Pakootas Plaintiffs developed a
number of theories of CERCLA liability,147 of which aerial
disposition was only one approach. Even by limiting “disposal” to
hazardous waste that is “first placed ‘into or on any land or
water,’”148 the Plaintiffs will be able to proceed with their “river
pathway” theory. These claims are based on the up to 145,000 tons
annually (until 1995) of heavy metal-laden slag the Trail Smelter
discharged directly into the Columbia River, where it flowed into
the UCR.149 Although the Ninth Circuit has previously determined
that Teck may be subject to CERCLA liability under this theory of
disposition,150 excluding the aerial claims may prevent restoration
of damage caused by Teck’s operations, but not directly
attributable to its waterborne discharges. Whatever its impact to
these facts on remand, the application of this holding to the wider
CERCLA field has the potential to cause far greater havoc.
B. Potential Effects Across CERCLA Litigation
As the Ninth Circuit notes, “disposal” recurs throughout
CERCLA provisions.151 Indeed, the term appears, among other
places: to define a “facility;”152 within the enumerated varieties of
“release;”153 and in the definitions of three out of the four classes of
147

Id. at 978–80.
Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF R. Co., 764 F.3d 1019,
1024 (9th Cir. 2014).
149
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069–70 (9th Cir.
2006).
150
Id. at 1082.
151
Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975, 982–83.
152
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2016).
153
Id. § 9601(22).
148
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“responsible persons,”154 within which a defendant must fall for
CERCLA liability to attach. The result is to arm potentially
responsible parties at any CERCLA site involving a question of
airborne contamination with a powerful precedent to argue against
their liability.
Moreover, this decision may eliminate a promising and unique
avenue for reaching the entry of transnational air pollution into the
United States. Trans-border pollution presents a thorny problem
for modern nations, as a receiving country will be unable to
enforce its substantive law against the producing country.155 While
CERCLA is no exception to this anti-extraterritorial doctrine,156 the
Ninth Circuit’s first Pakootas decision in 2006 demonstrated that
imposing liability on an extraterritorial polluter who causes
damage within the United States is not an extraterritorial
application of the law.157 Comparatively, the same court was clear
that applying United States laws governing the production of
pollution abroad (as opposed to its effects domestically), would be
impermissible as an extraterritorial application of law.158 This
suggests that other national regulatory schemes such as the CAA
and CWA will be unavailable for any cross-border suits. Instead,
CERCLA would be uniquely poised to deal with the trans-border
contamination. The latest Pakootas decision eliminates CERCLA’s
ability to reach threats of aerial pollution such as the maquiladoras
just across the United States’ southern border.

154

Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
In the United States, there is a “presumption against extraterritoriality” as it
relates to the reach of domestic law. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S.
385, 388–89 (2005) (“[Common sense] has led Court to adopt the legal
presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not
extraterritorial, application.”).
156
Hess, supra note 17, at 24–25.
157
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir.
2006) (“Because the CERCLA facility [i.e., the UCR site of contamination,] is
within the United States, this case does not involve an extraterritorial application
of CERCLA to a facility abroad.”).
158
Id. at 1078 (noting that the “Canadian equivalent of RCRA” is applicable
to Teck’s disposals within Canada).
155
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C. Un Ejemplo: las Maquiladoras
The Maquiladora Program began in 1965 as an economic
initiative by the Mexican government and incentivized foreign
companies to open “maquiladoras,” or manufacturing plants in the
region bordering the United States.159 In 1990 there were 1,700
maquiladoras, but following the passage of NAFTA, that number
had grown to 2,810 by 2006, over 80% of which were located in
states bordering the United States.160 However the significant
economic and industrial growth spurred by the program has
outpaced measures to manage industrial waste, leading to failing
air and water quality.161 This problem spans both sides of the
border, as the United States and Mexico share a number of
common airsheds.162 The U.S. and Mexican governments are
working together on a program to curb sources of trans-border
pollution from both countries through a non-binding bottom up
plan called Border 2020, authorized under the La Paz agreement
between the two countries.163
Although the overall scheme offers the opportunity to reduce
airshed-wide pollution, CERCLA suits have the flexibility to
swiftly identify and penalize the worst polluters, provided their
discharges of hazardous materials could be traced into the Unites
States. Should the well-intentioned process break down or advance
too slowly, after the Ninth Circuit’s 2006 Pakootas decision,
159

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & SECRETARÍA DE MEDIO AMBIENTE Y
RECURSOS NATURALES, BORDER 2020: U.S. MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAM
10,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/border2020summary_0.p
df (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter EPA BORDER 2020].
160
Id.
161
Eileen Zorc, The Border 2012 U.S.-Mexico Environmental Program: Will
A Bottom-Up Approach Work?, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 533, 544 (2004).
See also EPA BORDER 2020, supra note 159, at 11.
162
EPA BORDER 2020, supra note 159, at 11. An airshed is conceptually
analogous to a watershed, but deals with the body of air above a specific
geography that, due to “topography, meteorology, and/or climate, is frequently
affected by the same air mass.” U.S. FOREST SERV., Glossary of National Fire
and Air Workshop Terms 1, http://www.fs.fed.us/eng/rsac/airQ/Glossary.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
163
Id.
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which clarified that CERCLA does apply to domestic deposits of
internationally-generated contamination, citizens could have
brought suit to compel either remediation or reimbursement for
undertaking the cleanup themselves.
This backstop is desirable for two reasons. First, it is elegant to
apply U.S. law to reach border maquiladoras that “dispose” waste
into the United States because historically, a majority of the plants
have been owned by U.S. companies.164 Secondly, and more
importantly, where the courts of Country A permit suits to reach a
foreign corporation in Country B that has caused “direct harm to
the sovereign through transnational pollution,” the principle of
comity165 suggests that the foreign nation, B, now open to suits,
will embrace a similar policy as to corporations in Country A.166
In theory, the specter of being exposed to unlimited liability in
a foreign country for allowing waste products to pollute there is a
powerful incentive to self-regulate. In practice, the first phase of
the Pakootas litigation provoked the U.S. National Mining
Association to send letters to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell,
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and EPA administrator Michael
Leavitt, “imploring the administration to try and resolve the issue
through diplomatic means, as a resort to litigation could be
‘devastating’ if U.S. corporations were forced to defend suit in
either Canada or Mexico.”167
164

EPA BORDER 2020, supra note 159, at 10.
A fundamental principle of international law, comity concerns foreign
states’ mutual recognition of one another’s acts and laws, and the reciprocity of
jurisdictional limits to “maintain[] amicable and workable relationships between
nations.” See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,
2–4 (1991) (quoting Harold Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 589 (1983)).
166
Bret Benedict, Transnational Pollution and the Efficacy of International
and Domestic Dispute Resolutions Among the NAFTA Countries, 15 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 863, 886 (2009). Importantly, even in the absence of a foreign
CERCLA equivalent, Superfund itself authorizes foreign claimants to “assert a
claim to the same extent” as a U.S. citizen under particular circumstances. 42
U.S.C. § 9611(l)(1)–(4).
167
Bret Benedict, Transnational Pollution and the Efficacy of International
and Domestic Dispute Resolutions Among the NAFTA Countries, 15 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 863, 886 (2009).
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Thus, the Pakootas decision effectuates a twofold affront to the
border region. By wholly restricting claims based on the noxious
aerial emissions across the southern border it creates a regulatory
gap which subjects U.S. citizens to air pollution beyond redress,
but it also deprives Mexican citizens of the benefits that would
accrue from U.S. companies acting to minimize environmental
liability to their southern neighbors.
VI.
CONCLUSION
As the first case to consider this specific question of CERCLA
liability,168 the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to reaffirm
CERCLA’s broad mandate to protect environmental and human
health through quick and effective cleanup of hazardous wastes.
The Pakootas opinion painted the circuit’s earlier precedents in
CCAEJ and Carson Harbor as creating a narrow and clearly
defined box into which the current controversy must fit precisely.
However, a cursory review of Carson Harbor contradicts the
court’s announcement in Pakootas that it was bound to a rule
against passive migration. In spite of some similarities, CCAEJ
was likewise distinguishable on several legal and factual grounds,
including the unavailability of the CAA as an extraterritorial
application of U.S. law and the focus of the Pakootas claims on the
land deposition of Teck’s contamination, as opposed to airborne
effects alone, saving the theory from the court’s order-of-disposal
rule.
Instead, by reading a media-based restriction into “disposal,”
its holding creates a dangerous new precedent in the federal
circuits and provides a springboard for industry arguments against
liability for aerial contamination. Although the Clean Air Act may
independently reach some of these claims, both the Pakootas case
and the maquiladoras example demonstrate the gaps in protection
that will accrue through widespread adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s
168

Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“In over 30 years of CERCLA jurisprudence, no court has impliedly or
expressly addressed the issue of whether aerial emissions leading to disposal of
hazardous substances ‘into or on any land or water’ are actionable under
CERCLA.”).
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reasoning. Given the potentially major impacts of this decision, the
Pakootas Plaintiffs will almost certainly seek certiorari. The
Supreme Court should grant that petition and dispose with the
Ninth Circuit’s limited definition for good.

